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The Road to Ramadan

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PROFESSIONAL READING 91

technical efficiency and miniaturization? Because, and nonquant managers please copy, Air Force leadership of that era had grown up on strategic bombing using larger and heavier bomb models. Here indeed is the heart of the resistance to change. Again, the push to MIRV in the Navy was so highly integrated and effectively managed as a special projects office within OPNAV, that it raised bureaucratic jealousies among the older line bureaus and offices. Of such mundane things are decisions made and progress triggered. Of such mundane things also is proper progress hindered. Greenwood's analysis is precise, very extensively and competently documented, largely nontechnical and, for this reader at least, a primer into the intriguing and vital world of defense decisions and how in fact they are negotiated.

ROBERT F. DELANEY
Naval War College

Heikal, Mohamed. *The Road to Ramadan*. New York: Quadrangle, 1975. 285pp.

Any official or semiofficial Arab version of the most recent Arab-Israeli war is interesting, not so much for its description of military tactics and strategy, as for what it reveals about Arab attitudes towards both Israel and the superpowers.

Mohamed Heikal, former Egyptian Minister of Information and confidant of Presidents Nasser and Sadat, describes the origins, conduct and results of the 1973 war. Failure to undo the defeat of 1967 by diplomatic means, growing pressure on the Egyptian economy due to the spiraling costs of military preparedness, popular pressure for action and fear that the great powers would settle the Middle East problem by themselves convinced Sadat to act.

Heikal's description of the war itself is not very interesting. Accurate in broad outline, it is replete with errors of

fact and detail. Many of his military conclusions, such as the claim that the war marked the end of tank-air dominance, need more study and refinement before they can be accepted even tentatively.

His discussion of the political results is, however, fascinating. He claims that the Arabs misused the oil weapon and argues that the United States profited most from the embargo and price increase. This is certainly not the conventional wisdom in America, and Heikal's argument is certainly worthy of close attention.

Finally, Heikal offers some disturbing thoughts for the future. If internal pressures played a significant role in convincing Sadat to resort to war in 1973, they may well play a similar role in the not too distant future. In fact, in his Foreword, Heikal explicitly states that, "Another war is inevitable." Anybody concerned about the prospects for a long-term peace in the Middle East would do well to read Heikal's book with great care.

STEVEN T. ROSS
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Herwig, Holger H. *Politics of Frustration: The United States in German Naval Planning 1889-1941*. New York and Toronto: Little, Brown and Co., 1976. 323pp.

A scholarly study which addresses the question of naval attack on the United States by a continental power is of considerable importance to the American profession of arms.

Professor Herwig's book revolves around the examination of a central question: Was there continuity in German naval policy and planning against the United States from Bismarck to Hitler? In answer, Professor Herwig advances the theory that the German Navy and to a lesser extent, the German Army, were consistently interested in the United States as a possible enemy